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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
GARY WELCH BROWN, 
Defendant/Appellant : 
CaseNo.200660969-CA 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State has no disagreement with the facts of this case as the Appellant has 
presented them. The State therefore refers the Court to the Appellant's discussion of the 
relevant facts on pages 3 - 7 of the Appellant's brief. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue the Court must determine in this case is whether the trial court erred in 
allowing the testimony of Officer Shawn Carter regarding previous encounters he had 
with intoxicated persons. The admissibility of evidence is reviewed for "abuse of 
discretion or reasonability." State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 88, 4 |^ 11, 67 P.3d 1050 
(quoting Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, f 12, 40 P.3d 1155). This 
Court has previously stated that "'[w]hile relevant evidence is generally admissible . . . a 
1 
trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and 
we will find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion.'" 
Id. at 122 (quoting State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7). This "abuse of 
discretion" standard also applies to a trial court's determination of the prejudicial effect 
of evidence. See State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, % 23, 72 P.3d 127 (trial court's 
pre-trial ruling on the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence was not an abuse of 
discretion). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The testimony of Officer Carter regarding his training and experience was 
relevant to the issue of whether or not Officer Carter had probable cause 
to arrest, and therefore was admissible. 
The elements of the crime of public intoxication, as they apply to this case, are 
that a person must be (1) under the influence of alcohol, (2) to a degree that they pose a 
danger to themselves or others, (3) in a public place.1 The burden is on the State to prove 
each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Officer Carter's testimony was 
relevant to each of these elements, and was therefore admissible at Mr. Brown's trial. 
!The crime of intoxication is codified in § 76-9-701 of the Utah Code: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if the person is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, 
to a degree that the person may endanger the person or another, in a public place or 
in a private place where the person unreasonably disturbs other persons.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (Lexis 2007) 
2 
According to the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if it has any 
tendency to make "the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Utah R. Evid. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible except as provided for by statute, 
constitution, other rules of evidence, or other local rules. Id. at 402. Some such 
provisions are enumerated at Rule 403, which states that "[relevant] evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]" Id, at 403. The 
consequential fact addressed by Officer Carter's testimony, which goes to the first 
element of the offense, was whether he had any objectively identifiable information to 
indicate that the defendant was probably intoxicated. 
Probable cause determinations are reviewed under an "'objective standard: 
whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly . . . be 
drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be 
justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense'" for which he was 
arrested. State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 27 (quoting State v. Cole, 61A P.2d 119, 125 
(Utah 1983) (alterations in original). "The validity of the probable cause determination is 
made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer . . . 
guided by his experience and training.'" State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 
2Rules 401 to 403 match the corresponding Federal Rules of Evidence verbatim. 
3 
1986) (emphasis added, quoting United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. 
Cir.1972)). 
Officer Carter testified that he perceived several indicia of intoxication when he 
encountered Mr. Brown, including slurred speech, glassy eyes, unsteadiness on his feet, 
and a strong scent of alcohol emanating from him. Mr. Brown also admitted that he had 
been consuming alcohol in the last hour. Taking these factors into account, Officer 
Carter reasonably compared these symptoms to those of others he had encountered in 
order to determine whether it was probable that Mr. Brown was intoxicated. In other 
words, the testimony regarding the intoxilizer test results of others was not offered to 
show that Mr. Brown was intoxicated, but rather to show that Officer Carter's 
impressions were formed on objectively reasonable and prudent bases. Officer Carter's 
probable cause determination was at issue in this case, and therefore, any testimony 
serving to show that this determination was prudent and reasonable was admissible at 
trial. Officer Carter's impressions, and the training and experience he used to evaluate 
those impressions, were absolutely relevant to the State's case. 
The present case is readily distinguishable from State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 
P.2d 177, as discussed in the appellant's brief. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld a trial court's exclusion of testimony of an officer's knowledge of officer-assisted 
suicide, stating that it was irrelevant "to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the 
offense . . . [and] [did] not shed light on the defendant's intent or state of mind at the time 
of the offense." Id. at \ 28 (first two alterations in original). That case dealt with a very 
4 
different factual scenario than is present in this case. Colwell dealt with an exchange of 
gunfire between an officer and a driver during a traffic stop. Fortunately for the citizens 
of Washington County, incidents of gun violence are rare, and the necessity of officers 
being trained in identifying possible officer-assisted suicide attempts has comparatively 
little relevance to Mr. Brown's case. Conversely, officers frequently encounter 
intoxicated persons, and are commensurately familiar with the tell-tale signs of 
substance-induced impairment. It is quite reasonable for a court to conclude, as this 
Court has many times before, that an officer's observations of intoxication provide 
probable cause for arrest for public intoxication. See State v. Henderson, 2007 UT App 
125, 159 P.3d 397; State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052. Also, the elements at issue 
in Colwell particularly the intent of the defendant to kill the officer or to die as a result of 
his return fire, are not present in a simple public intoxication charge; intent is not an 
element of public intoxication. 
II: The probative value of Officer Carter's testimony outweighed its 
prejudicial potential. 
While Rule 403 protects parties against prejudicial evidence, all evidence 
establishing guilt is somewhat prejudicial to the defendant. Rule 403 only "excludes 
evidence which poses a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs the 
probative value of that evidence." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 80, 993 P.2d 837. 
Therefore, in determining whether testimony is unfairly prejudicial, the reviewing court 
must balance the testimony's probative value against its prejudicial value. Deters v. 
Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000). In 
5 
performing this balancing test, "'the court should give the evidence its maximum 
reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.'" Id. (quoting 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir.1992)). 
The State readily concedes that the questioned testimony possessed some minor 
prejudicial value. However, the probative force of the testimony far outweighed this 
prejudicial value. As Mr. Brown claims, there is the possibility that testimony led the 
jury to inaccurately and unconsciously link Mr. Brown to other intoxicated persons. 
However, this possibility was remote, and eliminated by the limitations on the testimony 
erected by the trial court. Judge Beacham specifically admitted the testimony "to suggest 
the officer's background and experience," and voiced that it would be inappropriate for 
the testimony to "suggest. . . anything directly measurement-wise toward Mr. Brown." 
(R. 66:143). These limitations effectively eliminated any prejudicial effect the testimony 
may have had, leaving only the probative value for the jury to consider. 
The probative value of this testimony was substantial. Officer Carter had 
previously encountered persons who both exhibited the same characteristics as Mr. 
Brown, such as slurred speech, glassy eyes, unsteadiness, and a predominant odor of 
alcohol on their persons. He had also administered blood-alcohol tests to these people, 
and all of them had tested as intoxicated. Therefore, in his training and experience, any 
other person displaying these characteristics would also probably test as intoxicated. 
Therefore, he felt he had probable cause to arrest Mr. Brown for intoxication when 
viewing his perceived condition in concert with his conduct towards Ms. Reynolds. The 
6 
questioned testimony had substantially more probative value than prejudicial value, and 
as such was admissible at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of Officer 
Carter regarding the intoxilyzer results of other persons. These results provided a 
reasonable basis for Officer Carter to conclude that Mr. Brown was probably guilty of the 
crime of intoxication, and was therefore relevant to the jury's factual calculus. The 
prejudicial potential of this testimony was outweighed by its probative value; therefore 
the trial court was correct to allow it, and defendant's conviction should be upheld. 
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